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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L. POLLE! and 
ESTRID L. POLLE!, His wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
JAMES W. BURGER and 
LENORE BGRGER, His \Vife, 




STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Defendants, James and Lenore Burger appeal 
from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs at the conclusion 
of a trial without jury in the Third Judicial District 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson presiding. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on the 2nd day of Feb-
ruary, 1969. 
On the 27th day of May, 1969, the trial 
of the above-mentioned matter, defendants moved for 
a dismissal of the action as a matter of law which was 
denied; A similar motion was entered at the conclusion 
of plaintiffs' presentation at trial, which was denied 
without prejudice by the Court. At the conclusion of 
trial, the Court rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. 
On the 16th day of June, 1969, pursuant to Rules 
52 (b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defend-
ants filed Motions to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law and Judgment and also moved for 
a New Trial. The .M'tions were heard before the Hon-
orable Joseph G. Jeppson on the 15th day of July, 
1969 who denied the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants submit that the verdict of the 
Court rendering judgment for the plaintiffs should 
be reversed, and an order entered that defendants are 
entitled to the relief prayed for in their Answer to 
Plaintiff's Complaint as a matter of law. 
2 
STA'l'El\IENT OF FACTS 
On .May 26, 1962, respondents entered into a Uni-
form Real Estate Contract with a Paul and Lathel 
\Vurst, which was admitted in evidence at trial as 
plaintiff's exhibit No. 1. On .May 28, 1962, respondents 
conveyed the property in question by \ V arranty Deed 
to the \V ursts. Said deed makes no reference to the 
afore mentioned Real Estate Contract nor to any inter-
ests, liens, or encumbrances as pertains to the property 
conveyed. Rather, the warranty deed was executed and 
delivered with no reservations. (See plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 2) . This Warranty Deed was recorded .May 
29, 1962. 
Almost two years elapsed before the filing of the 
Uniform Real Estate contract on January 4, 1964. On 
that same date, said contract was purportedly acknowl-
edged, mention of which will be made in appellants' 
argument for reversal as a matter of law. 
The said Wursts sold said property to the appel-
lants by Warranty Deed dated April 28, 1966, which 
deed made no reference to the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the Respondents and the \Vursts. 
At the time of this conveyance, the Wursts apparently 
owed money under the terms of said contract of which 
the appellants had no knowledge whatsoever. 
In July of 1967, the respondents obtained a judg-
ment against the Wursts for the balance owing on said 
contract in the amount of $3,477.66 together with at-
torneys fees and costs. 
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It was not until after the appellants had purchased 
and taken possession of the property in question that 
they received notice that the \V ursts owed the respond-
ents the money representing the balance due under 
said contract. 
The action from which this appeal is taken result-
ed with the filing of the respondent's complaint to im-
press a Vendor's Lien on February 7, 1968, upon the 
property in question. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE PRECLUDED 
UNDER UTAH LAW FROlVI ASSERTING A 
VENDOR'S LIEN UPON THE PROPERTY IN" 
QUESTION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE 
WARRANTY DEED FROM THE RESPOND-
ENTS TO THE WURSTS, THE APPEL-
LANTS' GRANTORS, \VAS EXECUTED AND 
DELIVERED \VITHOUT MENTION OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE UNPAID OBLIGA-
TION ON THE PURCHASE PRICE UNDER 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
The case of PETERSON v. CARTER, 11 Utah 
2d 381, 359 P. 2d 1055 (1961), a case almost on all 
fours factually with the case a't hand, unanimously 
held, that in a suit to impress a vendor's lien on prop-
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erty purchased by third parties from the vendee, that 
because the vendor-plaintiffs executed and delivered 
\Varranty Deeds to the vendee that made no mention of 
an existing and unpaid obligation by virtue of a RE-
CORDED contract, that the plaintiffs were preclud-
ed from asserting said Lien. 
The court further stated that the Plaintiffs in that 
action had waived any claim to a vendor's lien due to 
their failure to make mention of the same in the 'y ar-
ranty Deeds plaintiff executed to the defendant's gran-
tors. The court specifically made reference to and re-
lied upon Utah Code Ann., 1953, 57-1-12 where it is 
stated that: 
"Any exceptions to such convenants may be brief-
ly inserted in such (Warranty) deed following the de-
scription of the land."Examination of plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2, the warranty Deed in question, reveals there is 
absolutely no mention of any Lien following the de-
scription. 
This court in the PETERSON case went further 
to reject the argument made that the fact that the con-
tract was recorded should have given notice of the un-
paid obligation on the purchase price. In dicta this 
court said that if any notice were given by the record-
ation of the contract, "it was to the effect that would 
lead a reasonable person to believe and assume that all 
sums due under the contract had been paid and that all 
the covenants inuring to the benefit of the plaintiff's 
had been performed; and that if not, it was plaintiff's 
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own failure to protect themselves, and they had waiYed 
any claim to any real or illusory vendor's lien." PE-
TERSON v. CARTER, 359 P. 2d at 1057. 
Impliedly, this Court held that the purchasers of 
the property were bonaf ide purchasers who purchased 
in good faith without notice of any encumbrances and 
were therefore entitled to take free of the existing lien. 
See also 2 Jones on Liens, 2d Ed., 1084, P. 27, which 
states that " ... A Recital NOT in a Deed under 
which a subsequent purchaser claims title will not bind 
him." (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the fact that, in this case now before the bar, 
the contract was filed after the warranty deed was 
recorded is irrevelant. Subsequent purchasers need only 
look to their grantor's deed. To hold otherwise in this 
case would result in the ludicrous situation that a ven-
dor, who fails to promptly record his contract, but 
rather does so two years subsequent to his conveyance 
by Deed, would prevail. 
In light of the above principles and well-settled 
Utah law on the subject, the lower court in this case 
now before the bar was clearly in error in rendering its 
verdict for the respondents. 
POINT II 
THE FACT THAT THE UNIFOR1"1 REAL 
ESTATE CONTRACT WAS RECORDED DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTIYE N0-
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TICE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID COX-
TRACT 'VAS DEFECTIVELY ACKXO"rL-
EDGED. 
The plaintiff's own testimony, see Record, 
page 45, line 3, discloses the fact that the defendants 
ne\·er received actual notice of the unpaid obligation in 
question. Also, no mention of actual notice is made in 
the plaintiff's findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, 
pages 18 to 21 of the record. Thus, the question turns 
on whether the recorded Real Estate Contract consti-
tuted constructive notice. 
Plaintiff's exhibt No. 1, the contract in question, 
reveals that the respondents, William L. Pollei and 
Estrid L. Pollei, signed as the Sellers and that Paul R. 
\\Turst and Lathel Wurst signed as Buyers. But the 
acknowledgment by the Notary Public, a Helen R. 
Fife, only acknowledged the signatures of the Sellers. 
the Polleis. Now here are the signatures of the Buyers, 
the ,;v ursts ever acknowledged on the face of the con-
tract. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Sec. 57-1-6 reqmres that 
in order to entitle an instrument to recordation and 
thereby constitute constructive notice, a proper ack-
nowledgment is required. Conversely, "An instrument 
defectively executed or acknowledged is not entitled to 
recordation and its record is not constructive notice." 
C.J.S., Vendor & Purchaser, ss 341, p. 265. 
The acknowledgment is defective in other aspects 
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as well. The Record, page 50, lines 27-30, reveals that 
one of the plaintiffs, \Villiam L. Pollei, never 
knew, talked with, or was familiar with the officer tak-
ing the acknowledgment, Helen R. Fife. Thus, when 
the grantor is unknown to the acknowledging officer, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Sec. 57-2-8, specifically requires 
a particular form of acknowledgment, a form which was 
not followed on the Real Estate Contract. 
The cases are legion and the law is well-settled that 
defectively acknowledged instruments do not impart 
constructive notice. 1 Am J ur 2d, Acknowledgments, 
Sec. 90, p. 505; 59 ALR2d 1309, Sec. 9. 
POINT III 
BY VIRTUE OF CERTAIN ACTIONS TAK-
EN BY RESPONDENTS DURING THE 
TRANSACTION IN QUESTION, THEY ARE 
ESTOPPED, PRECLUDED AND HAVE 
WAIVED ANY TO A VENDOR'S 
LIEN. 
Plaintiffs exhibit No. 2, the Warranty Deed from 
the Plaintiffs-Respondents to the Wurst, the Defend-
ants' -Appellants' grantors, as has been previously men-
tioned contains no reservations whatsoever of the claim-
' ed Vendors Lien. There is, however, a recital of Ten 
($10.00) Dollars as being the consideration for the con-
veyance. But the law on this aspect is well-settled: 
"\Vhere the deed recites payment of !he 
eration, the vendor cannot enforce his vendors 
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lien for the purchase money which is in fact un-
paid, as against a subsequent purchaser who was 
ignorant at the time his co11veya11ce was executed 
that the purchase money was unpaid." C.J.S. 
Yendor & Purchaser, Sec. 401, p. 344. 
Another action taken by the respondents as reveal-
ed by the complaint, at page 2 of the Record, paragraph 
-!, constitutes a waiver of the claimed Lien. Said plead-
ing states that the plaintiffs give the warranty deed, 
plaintiffs exhibit No. 2, to the \Vursts, appellants' 
grantors, for the purpose of effectuating the obtaining 
a mortgage from Zions First National Bank (See plain-
tiffs exhibit No. 3). However, the law is settled that: 
"A conveyance by the vendor for the avowed 
purpose of enabling the vendee to mortgage the 
property in order to obtain money for payments 
due the vendor in order to obtain money for pay-
ment due the vendor evinces an intention to rely 
on an express pledge of the hand and constitues 
a waiver of the vendors implied Lien." C.J.S. 
Vendor & Purchaser, \i\T aiver, Sec. 409, p. 352. 
Furthermore, the mortgage itself states that the 
holder thereof, Zions First National Bank, is the First 
Mortgagor which further undermines the Respondents' 
argument that a prior Lien existed on the property. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants in this action purchased bona fide 
from a fraudulent purchaser, by virtue of the fact that 
they had no actual or constructiYe notice of the exist-
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ence of any claim by the respondents to a Yendors Lien. 
Being bonafide purchasers, the appellants must pre-
vail in this appeal. The Respondents failed to protect 
their Lien by numerous omissions and actions as ha\ 
been previously mentioned and should be predwled 
from now asserting any claim against the appellants. 
In view of the above foregoing facts and well-
settled precedents and principles of law, appellauts re-
spectfully submit that the lower court should ha,·e up-
held defendants' motion for dismissal as a matter of law, 
or found in favor of the defendants at the conclusion of 
the trial. 
This court should reverse the decision of the lower 
court for relief in accordance herewith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENT T. YANO 
GLENN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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